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The process of applying norms and standards through social-
ized justice now generally extends to the delinquency, neglect
and dependency of children as well as, in part, to jurisdiction
over adult offenses and to some aspects of domestic relations
jurisdiction. The recent growth of the youth authority idea
extends it still further. With the report of a committee of the
American Bar Association1 recommending to the White House
Conference reorganization and revision of divorce procedures,
we may expect extensions of socialized justice to areas not yet
too affected by it and legislation to this end. It is therefore
appropriate to examine the ideological and normative conflict in.
certain presently established areas of socialized justice. More-
over, the Standard Juvenile Court Act2 is again undergoing
revision and certain provisions of the new youth acts have not
been accepted without dissent. Thus, in drafting new bills to
revise the present procedures in divorce, separation, custody and
collateral matters, the experience gained in the operation of
juvenile, family, and domestic relations courts will prove to be
valuable.
An important difficulty .with respect to the operations of
juvenile and family courts (as for all institutions) is directly
related to the conflict of those norms which ultimately determine
operation.8 Within the juvenile court structure, we find em-
bedded norms carried over from legal operations as well as
norms introduced from the social service and inductive disci-
plines. Within the juvenile court, as well as between the court
and the social agencies, conflict results from the juxtaposition
1 See Reginald Heber Smith, Paul W. Alexander, et al. (as members of an American
Bar Association Committee), Report to National Conference on Family Life, March
1948 (White House Conference). The recommendations on divorce, new juilsdiction,
etc., adopted by the Conference May 7, 1948.
2 The Standard Juvenile Court Act of the National Probation Association, 1943.
8 This paper is an elaboration of certain normative factors described in a more
general treatment of the juvenile court; see Frederick W. Killian, "The Juvenile
Court as an Institution," Annals of the American Academiy of Political and Social
Science, January 1949, which is documented for recent status of the court.
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of two norms or conceptions of process, each of which is basic to
the organization of the court as a "socialized" tribunal, namely:
jurisdiction and intake. Each norm tends to symbolize the con-
ditions and limitations for the application of the court's func-
tion-as symbols of function, they reflect its very nature. Each
includes certain aspects of the other; each also symbolizes dis-
parate conceptions of institutional procedure and organization.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss certain implications of
these two conceptions and to suggest, theoretically at least, a
method for accommodation of the normative conflict resulting
from their inclusion in a court of combined operations-social
and legal.
No insuperable difficulty arises in the functional analysis of
the norms and standards of social work and social service.
These fields have both developed, if slightly later, almost con-
temporaneously with the inductive fields known as the social
sciences; in fact, they are or are becoming the applications
thereof. With law, however, both structure and terminology
present initial blocks to its analysis as a means of social control.
The intake process is easier to identify than the process of
determining jurisdiction. Like jurisdiction, intake possesses
abstract significance and may be analyzed as a norm of pro-
cedure in the social work area. But, unlike jurisdiction and cer-
tain other abstract terms, it may be emblematic-as a sign, it
may be placed over the door of the intake worker in a social
agency. Thus it possesses the advantage of concreteness and
often involves a special functionary. On the other hand, assum-
ing an attempt to place the sign jurisdiction over some door in
a court house, one would find no appropriate place. The lack of
sense in attempting the latter is to be found in the nature of the
judicial process.4 The sense in intake, as a sign, is to be found
in the nature of the social work process and, in addition, intake
itself is a process (a division or specialty of treatment) by which
may be determined the appropriateness of the agency's defined
function in relation to a particular client. The decision to reject
or accept the client is not arbitrary, as sometimes thought, but
is formed by abstracting certain factors in the client's situation
and matching them against a definition of the agency function;
this is done by reference to a refined abstraction of function, the
unit of attention.5 The process, it must be emphasized, depends
4 See, generally, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1921; Roscoe Pound, Interpretation of Legal History, New
York, The Macmillan Company 1923, and Social Control Through Law, New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1942.
5 See Florence Sytz, "The Unit of Attention in the Case Work Process," The
Family (Journal of Social Case Work), 27:4, June 1946.
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on an initial client-worker interview in a face to face situation.
Intake, then, is a process related to the public security, also
served by jurisdiction.
Leaving intake for the moment, the term jurisdiction calls for
functional identification. Unlike intake, which is strictly a pro-
cess or a concept of process, legally speaking, jurisdiction may
be regarded as if it were a fact. It is determined judicially,
largely through the pleadings. It is for the court (not a jury)
to determine if the pleadings reveal what is termed and allowed
by law as a cause of action and, if it so determines, the court
rules that it possesses jurisdiction 7 to hear and determine.
Thus, the assumption of jurisdiction (power) is a continuing
part of the judicial process but intake is an initial stage of the
social work process. The judicial process operates to a conclu-
sion (remedy) from valid causes of action which are abstractions
of particularized behaviors. carefully defined which, sociologi-
cally speaking, disturb equilibrium of interaction which must
be restored. These behavior disturbances give rise to the idea
of public security for the preservation of which the -judicial
process, speciItcally specifying the remedy, has become sanc-
tioned as a substitute for a too wide range of self-help. The
causes of action are structures which, over a long time, have
been abstracted from behavioral situations which experience
has shown have tended to produce interaction imbalance;
thus they have become norms determining and limiting the
proper application of the judicial process. Here, the alleged
disturbing behavior of a person must be matched against some
legally available cause of action before a plaintiff may be
granted his judicial remedy. The court insists that the plain-
tiff, in criminal cases the state (note the survival of the self-
help element), establish a case. To do this the plaintiff must
not only offer proof of the defendant's alleged behavior but
must select his norm or standard of remedy (.ciuse of action)
and bring the defendant's behavior (criminal or civil) within it
in conformity with a process of proof (judicially supervised)
called the law of evidence. This signifies, of course, an imper-
sonal process where the judgment which restores equilibrium is
extracted indirectly from a situation in which proven behavior
is set off against an ideals type of behavior (i.e., not socially
6 Social workers do not speak of "having intake" as judges of "having juris-
diction. "1
7 As used here, power to act-for wider implications, see Black's Law Dictionary
(3rd ed.). For present purposes, it is not essential to elaborate jurisdiction in ito
manifold aspects.
8 For discussion of the sociological significance of the ideal type, see A. M. Hender-
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approved, but an ideal of disapproved behavior formulated out
of experience in terms of the possibilities at hand for control
purposes). Thus we note a similarity: both intake and jurisdic-
tion involve behavior set off against behavior-in law, actual
current behavior against an ideal of behavior expressed usually
as a taboo ;9 in social work, the behavior of a client set off against
behavior which the agency is equipped to deal with by definition
and experience.
Thus the norms of procedure symbolized by intake and juris-
diction are directed (sociologically) to ultimately identical ends
or goals using similar postulates, the primacy of the individual
and the restoration of social equilibrium. However, the distinc-
tion between them lies in those situations in which each can func-
tion effectively. Difficulties and conflicts arise in juvenile and
family courts because social agency functions are confused in
operation with judicial functions. Within a pure social agency
intake implements the defined agency function. But in an auth-
oritarian (legal) agency, jurisdiction with all its implications
of legality, and often of legalism, determines the limits of intake
policy so that where, as in a juvenile or family court, the judge
operates with a social staff, conflict of norms tends to follow.
The conflict in certain areas of combined legal and social oper-
ations is not unique in the law today. The time has long since
arrived when the exigencies of life have outgrown the conceptual
and doctrinal framework of the law as classically known and
understood, and this has been reflected in an expansion of jural
postulates to provide for remedies which the jurists have been
unable to justify within the boundaries of the classical remedial
stereotypes. This phenomenon has been expounded by Dean
Pound who describes the expansion of jural postulates underly-
ing legal remedy in our own time.10 After specifying five jural
postulates of civilized society, each of which has been recognized
as a component part of civilized systems of law-mainly the
Roman and Anglo-American systems-he describes in outline
the emergence, during the last century, of three other jural pos-
tulates, one of which is directly pertinent to this discussion and
which may be paraphrased as follows: that there is now a public
interest in the risk of unfortunate individuals, thought to con-
stitute a responsibility necessary to be borne by society as a
whole. This proposition would seem to be a juridical recogni-
son and Talcott Parsons (eds.), Maz Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947.
9 For a concentrated collection of short statements on remedy at the common law
see Walter Wheeler Cook, Readings on the Forms of Action at Common Law, Chicago,
Callaghan and Company, 1940.
10 Roscoe Pound, Social Control, pp. 112-118.
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tion that the law, at least in all fields, can no longer operate
exclusively within the older definition of self-help and of process.
Of course, this idea has been emerging for some time and indeed
has materialized or been incarnated in the form of legal aid
clinics, public defender laws, as well as in the incidents of social-
ized justice and of administrative law where behavior circum-
stance and legal remedy are no longer the exclusive touchstones
for the application of the judicial process, but where, rather, an
emphasis is placed on individualized rather than on generalized
behavior. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss whether
or not all the extensions of this principle have been valid, but
rather to show some of their normative effects, particularly in
the operation of juvenile courts. Having described certain im-
plications inherent in two norms of procedure, jurisdiction and
intake, it is necessary to indicate some of the concrete effects of
their juxtaposition and then to suggest certain prerequisites for
accommodation.
It has been said that the essential similarity between juris-
diction and intake lies in the fact that each of them may be
referred to the more generalized concept the public security.,.
Does either epitomize the public security more basically than the
other? Will intake eventually become the dominant process in
socialized justice or will it continue, as it now tends to be, sup-
plementary and complementary to jurisdiction? 
The purpose for which the juvenile court was designed was to
extricate the child from the four corners of a system of stereo-
typed legal remedy formulated through and applied by the crim-
inal law in which, by judicial pronouncement related to behavior
circumstance,12 offenders were clothed with criminal status. In
this process which has in general been the classical approach to
the question of deviant behavior, lasting until quite recently, it
must also be apparent that all premises which led to legal status
by reason of adjudication based on some form of deviant be-
havior-behavior in the sense of cause and effect-were formu-
lated as assumptions. In other words, the major premises with
reference to man-his aims, goals, and operations-grew out of
a limited empiricism'which led to the formulation of jural con-
cepts concerning the nature of law and its appropriate applica-
11 Roscoe Pound, " IThe Juvenile Court and the Law,"I Cooperation in Crime Control(Yearbook, -New York, National Probation Association), 1944--discusses this concept
as determining the organization of the court.
12 Behavior circumstance as distinguished from treatment consequence is discussed
by Jerome Hall, "Criminology and a Modern Penal Code," Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 27:1, May-June 1936; the implications of these terms in practice
are discussed by Paul W. Tappan, Delinquent Girls in Court, New York, Columbia
University Press, 1947; the only fully objective, scientific treatment of a socialized
court in operation (vastly underestimated and misunderstood by the reviewers).
1949]
FREDERICK W. KILLIAN
tion to human behavior. The institutionalization (and thus the
differentiation) of the law around major premises formulated
as an incident of its own process, elliptically and empirically, was
satisfied by jurisdiction which was also connected with theories
of predictive value as embodied- in ideas of the natural law as an
idealization of time and place formulated within a relatively
uncomplicated society and, indeed, before any strictly secular
concept of society had been explicitly propounded. In the Middle
Ages, for instance, though law and religion had become partially
differentiated, nevertheless, a unity of both law and religion was
effected within a synthesis universally accepted in Western Civ-
ilization and the law long had supplementary services from that
quarter. The best single example of this synthesis was the Sum-
ma Theologica of St. Thomas. Here was a formula for the appli-
cation of remedy from premises of individualization quite differ-
ent from those we now understand to be included in any concept
of individuation1& At that time the possibilities of complexity in
human behavior and culture had not been projected; behavior
therefore could be idealized in terms of comparatively simple.
theoretical entities (in terms, for instance, of will and other
faculties regarded as entities). However, since the rejection of
the faculty psychology and since the growth of the concepts
socialization and individuatin to explain human behavior %vith
which came, first, less interdependence of law and legal process
on complementary and supplementary institutions and, later, the
development of newer separate areas for the support of the
individual, the older jural postulates with reference to behavior
and to the consequences of behavior were found to be insufficient
and the jurists have been faced either with the necessity of re-
casting the older postulates by extension within the law, or of
reaching out to seize postulates from the inductive disciplines.
14
In practice, both methods have been pursued, but even the former
has been influenced by the wealth of materials in the inductive
disciplines. One of the importations from the new disciplines
grew out of a dawning consciousness that behavior circumstance
with respect to children meant something different than when
applied to adults. This was manifested at first as a general
expression of awareness that criminal courts were inappropriate
forums for the handling of children's cases. Almost prema-
turely, at least in view of the absence of perfected procedures
18 James W. H. Bossard examines the origin of 'the individual', sociologically, in
Social Change and Sodal Problems, New York, Harper and Brothers, 2ncL ed., 1939,
Chap. VI.
14 See Huntington Cairns, Law and the Soial Sciences, New York, Harcourt Brace
and Company, 1935.
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and practices, the juvenile court came into being depending on a
practice of probation, in turn based on the idea of a charity-
motivated amicus curiae. Its procedures were unspecific, its
operations undefined.
After the establishment of the juvenile court, it was discov-
ered that the concept jurisdiction, as understood in the classical
legal dispensation, had lost a good deal of its implementation.
For one thing, unlike the definition of a criminal act, which is
still specific, the definition of delinquency has tended to become
vague and to depend more and more upon the moral predilec-
tions of the judge. It is apparent that even this change alone
has thrust upon the judge a responsibility far wider in the hear-
ing and determining of cases than that which has been imposed
upon criminal judges at least since the formative days of the
English criminal law. This vagueness in definition has meant
that the question of jurisdiction has almost become one to be
settled by each judge-by each judge in relation to each offender,
with no stated guide for action, and restrained only by operation
of due process, the necessity for a fair trial, and ultimately by
judicial review. These processes too are difficult of application
due to the lack of specificity of the basic normative operations
in the juvenile courts. It has also tended to confuse jurisdiction
with intake so that the judge is tempted to use what are, prop-
erly speaking, intake norms to compensate for the lack of juris-
dictional implementation; but when an offense committed by a
child is so serious that the age of the offender must be regarded
as less important than the consequence of his act (behavior cir-
cumstance-as an incident in disturbing the social equilibrium)
the juvenile court judge tends to revert to the more precise
enunciation of remedy embodied in the classical criminal law;
and, indeed, this is often sanctioned by statutory provisions for
transfer of jurisdiction to criminal courts in such cases.' 5 In
the vast majority of cases, however, the question of the offense
(i.e., behavior circumstance) is not actually as serious as that of
the predicament of the child before the judge, and it is precisely
here (treatmnent conseqiience) that a wide latitude for abuse is
apparent.' 6
It has sometimes been said that the introduction of social
techniques into the juvenile court process has been responsible
for this dilemma but it would appear, on the contrary, that the
trouble has resulted because the social techniques have not been
applied on a sufficiently high professional plane and consequently
15 Sec. 6, Standard Juvenile Court Act, as a generally typical provision.
16 For elaboration, see Tappan, op. cit.
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could not substitute for the loss of jurisdictional implementation.
Therefore, the juvenile court judge has had to assume the addi-
tional responsibility mentioned, which is not essential in a crim-
inal court, for which he is not trained and which is part of the
prognosis function. It is true, of course, that the judge's con-
science might be salved by reason of the fact that the juvenile
court law eliminates the necessity for pronouncing criminal
status-often the judge passes over the process of adjudication
completely and treats the case as unofficial. Too often, it is un-
recognized by the judge himself, and certainly by the public, that
the damage which can be done to a person by free adjudication,
here exercised in a social vacuum and without sufficiently defined
areas of protection, may far exceed that which is done by appli-
cation of a legal rule which is protectively precise both in form
and in content.
Thus one of the current normative conflicts in the court con-
cerns the question whether or not there must be a finding of
delinquency in a juvenile court before any further proceedings
may be taken. This question has been answered in the affirma-
tive and strenuously insisted upon in the Children's Court of
New York City as well as in the Boston Juvenile Court. Unfor-
tunately, most arguments with reference to this question have
engendered a good deal of heat and have ended only in arbitrary
insistence upon that position propounded. This is largely be-
cause the. problem has not been properly formulated, for it is not
at all a question of whether the court should pronounce a child
delinquent or dismiss the case upon the hearing of the petition;
it is rather a question of what cases of what children the juvenile
court (as a court) should hear. But the position maintained by
the Boston and New York courts emerges from a framework of
scholasticism and is essentially equivalent to the proposition con-
cerning how many angels can dance on the point of a needle-
the distinction being that it merely appears to be a more reason-
able one from the modern point of view. True, jurisdiction, be-
ing a classical concept of the Anglo-American law, involves
proof of an act before pronouncement of a status. But it canot
be argued that delinquency from the legal point of view is more
or less than status. True, it is a, status which carries less dis-
ability than that of criminality, but the difference is one of
degree, not of kind. It may well be that for some children delin-
quency may carry more stigma than crime for some adults. It
must also be said. that in our social system and institutional life
no other method exists for pronouncing status legally than
through the medium of jurisdiction. Restating the question, it is
[Vol. 39
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not whether we shall dispose of either of the concepts, jurisdic-
tion or intake, but to what type of cases the concepts may appro-
priately be applied. The answer to this question must depend
upon an analysis of comparative means of social control for, as
we have come to think, the law is not an exclusive means of
social control. Perhaps, with reference to the child, as well as
in other areas of life, the application of some newer forms of
control than law would outweigh the advantages insisted upon
by the legalists-namely that all deviant behavior be totally
encompassed within the framework of jurisdiction. If we had
no other areas for dealing with children than the juvenile court,
which indeed was largely the case at the time when our first
juvenile court law was adopted (1899), 17 any argument for con-
sidering other controls would have less validity. One of these
other methods has been partly developed within the juvenile
court itself and is known as probation, now translating into
social case work-here too conflict as to whether probation is
case work or an independent technique is noticed, resulting also
from scholastic and semantic confusion of the issue.
Contrary to public opinion, the development of probation was
an institutional necessity and not merely, as most people think,
the interjection into the situation of some person who could
function as a friend to the child. Since the juvenile court judge's
discretion in the disposition of cases became widened and ceased
strictly to conform.to the definitions in the criminal law, it soon
became essential to provide some form of predictive technique.
This has been accomplished to some extent by probation-an
institutionalized area. It has been accomplished for the most
part quite poorly; in some places very well indeed.18 Consider-
ing the courts where probation has been well performed, conflict
between judicial function and social work function has tended to
become pronounced particularly if the judge is a legalist.
All this leads to another question: namely, within the juvenile
court, shall we make the social work or the judicial process
dominant? At least this is the usual way in which the question
is put; it is submitted that this question is related to the ques-
tion just discussed with reference to a finding of delinquency.
It is a question of the same type and it is a scholastic formula-
tion. Again, re-stated, we now have two processes for dealing
with deviant behavior-the judicial process and the social work
17 See Alice Scott Nutt, "The Responsibility of the Juvenile Court and the Public
Welfare Agency in the Child Welfare Program," R edireoing the Delinquent, New
York, National Probation and Parole Association Yearbook, 1947.
18 See Thorsten Sellin, "Adult Offenders," Social Work Year Book, New York,
Russell Sage Foundation, 1947, pp. 33-35.
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process. It is not an arbitrary question, which shall be domi-
nant. That question arises solely out of the illusion caused by
juxtaposition and lack of the comparative method in analysis.
It is obvious, of course, that, in the juvenile court, legal status
can be determined only by the judge or, if he abdicates, by the
social worker. From incident to incident either may be dominant
and it is also true that there may be a juggling of dominance,
depending upon the personnel of the court. This method is en-
tirely unsatisfactory and the fact that some courts work pretty
well along these lines constitutes no ultimate solution to the
problem. The question, rather, is what behavior of what chil-
dren can best be handled within social work areas, and what in
judicial areas. That each must bow to the other (as separate
areas of control) under certain prescribed conditions formulated
out of observation and testing seems simple enough as a socio-
logical proposition.
In thinking of the future of our juvenile courts, we are con-
fronted with the problem of how to combine two operations-
those determined by jurisdiction and those determined by intake.
In a court of combined operations, where probation or social
work is performed by a staff which is part of the court, the judge
is usually designated as head of the court. If the staff is un-
trained and largely unmotivated by professional ideals and the
judge is not interested in a professional staff, jurisdiction is
apt to dominate, with the results described, and dispositions will
tend to follow the judge's personalizations, predilections and
ideas concerning the meaning of offenses, thus constituting a
system which is essentially a dispensation of secular indul-
gences. 19 And so in a court where the staff is composed of pro-
fessionals or where the staff serving the court is part of an
independent, professionalized probation organization, conflict of
norms usually develops unless the judge is willing and able to
distinguish between legal and social work functions-not too
often the case. Much can be said for either "system'" but neither
can be expected to work unless the functional components of the
institution are relatively defined and this has not yet been satis-
factorily accomplished.
The Standard Juvenile Court Act, and some statutes,20 pro-
vide for a system which, it might be said, is the beginning of
wisdom in this respect-the provision for referees-but so far,
the provision is neitlier sufficiently elaborated nor specific. A
concrete example of this provision in operation is to be found at
19 Tappan, op. cit.
20 For instance, Ohio Code Annotated, See. 1639-21.
[Vol. 39
JURISDICTION, I2'TAKE, SOCIALIZED JUSTICE
the Toledo Court where all cases are heard initially by referees
operating under statutory provision with a right of re-hearing
before the judge, if demanded. Actually, very few such re-hear-
ings are demanded but, nevertheless, the system there has for
ten years revolved around the administration of a judge who
understands and, indeed, is an expert on the subject. The elec-
tion of a new judge, unfavorably disposed toward the system of
initial hearings by referees through social techniques-a Phar-
aoh who knew not Joseph-could quickly reduce the system to
impotence. Implicit in this analysis, of course, is the proposition
that the work of a judge in a juvenile court is a specialty and
that little opportunity exists for learning it except through ex-
perience. 21 Nor can we be hopeful that, in the near future, social
workers and judges will enjoy the results of a common taught
experience-such as law and social work taught as social policy.
This being the case, what is the prognosis for a court of com-
bined operations using social and legal functions without either
incessant friction or ending in the atrophy of function by one of
the essential component functionaries?
To achieve operating facility in courts of combined operations,
one expedient has been used with some success-the conference
method. This is a social work technique more often than not
difficult for any judge to comprehend and always at least initially
difficult for any judge to apprehend. However, where the judge
is favorably disposed to the professional staff, it has produced
valuable insights and procedures. But as a solvent for the prob-
lem it is still merely an expedient; as a method within a proper
definition of function, it is invaluable. It cannot take the place
of functional definition but its results if studied will offer valu-
able guides for a new policy design for juvenile court structure
and operations.
For adequate solution of the problem, we are again forced
back upon the concepts analyzed at the outset. Being disparate
concepts of function, related only by ultimate purpose, each must
be protected within a prescribed area of operation, legally de-
fined. It is the function of law to pass on behavior circumstance,
to protect the person, to insist on the application of due process,
and to enunciate status. It is not the function of the judge, acting
within the legal ideology and as an incident in the exercise of the
judicial process to determine, supervise or to interfere with
treatment-i.e., to operate as part of the social work process.
But, where the social work process looks to a directive entailing
21 Paul W. Alexander, "IOf Juvenile Court Justice ara Judges," Redirecting the
Deli-quent, New York, National Probation Association Yearbook, 1947 (ed. Mar-jorie Bell. The author is judge of the Toledo court.)
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status determination, then that is within the scope of a properly
defined and functionally separate but related exercise of the
judicial process and the interjection of the judge is appropriate
and essential.
To achieve this separation of function, the judge (as is not
-now the case) should be restrained by explicit provisions in
statutes establishing juvenile courts from exercising other than
jurisdiction; incidents of casework or treatment should be de-
fined and the function delegated in specific terms to an appro-
priate functionary or agency. So far, this is merely logical de-
duction from premises abstracted from the meaning content of
jurisdiction and of intake, each symbolizing disparate but
equally necessary functions. So far, in juvenile courts, this has
not been satisfactorily provided for by tight definitions of the
processes to be used in the respective areas of operation.
Such a definition must follow an idea common to both the law
and to social work-a common denominator of goals, purposes
and interests to be served. It has been suggested that this com-
mon denominator is found in the concept public security, for the
protection of which, each in its own manner, the norms of proc-
ess, jurisdiction and intake, may operate. This means analyzing
social work and law as two means of social control operating
with respect to behavior, each within its limits as a means of
social control. Therefore, the conditions of the proper operation
of each-abstracted from an operational analysis of each-must
be specified by statute. It is obvious that this argument leads to
an attentuation of those operations now assumed to be within
the province of our juvenile courts and if the premises of this
paper, initially stated, are correct, the conclusion is not more
than a logical deduction. The question of how this shall be
achieved is one that requires separate attention for it involves
a discussion of several other norms such as, for instance, course
of conduct, and this is not within the scope or purview of this
paper which is meant as a preface toward a revised policy
design for the juvenile court in the making of which will be
needed the results of many ideas and experiences. As part of the
preface, however, it may yet be in order to summarize the theo-
retical conclusions of this analysis as propositions to be re-
garded in the formulation of such policy design:
In application of socialized justice
1. The respective areas of jurisdiction and of intake should
be explicitly delineated.
2. The definitions of behavior types (behavior circumstance
[Vol. 39
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and treatment consequence) involving the application of juris-
diction and of intake should be sufficiently detailed for applica-
tion.
3. The essential areas of treatment should be explicitly sanc-
tioned by legal recognition.
4. The types of procedures for referral or removal from
treatment areas to judicial areas should be specified, generally,
on the basis of experience.
5. The protective aspects of jurisdiction should be specified
and procedures for the exercise of protective jurisdiction should
be made specific in relation to intake.
